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The use of quantum bits (qubits) in cryptography holds the promise of secure cryptographic
quantum key distribution schemes. Unfortunately, the implemented schemes can be totally insecure.
We provide a thorough investigation of security issues for practical quantum key distribution, taking
into account channel losses, a realistic detection process, and modifications of the “qubits” sent from
the sender to the receiver. We first show that even quantum key distribution with perfect qubits
cannot be achieved over long distances when fixed channel losses and fixed dark count errors are taken
into account. Then we show that existing experimental schemes (based on “weak-pulse”) are usually
totally insecure. Finally we show that parametric downconversion offers enhanced performance
compared to its weak coherent pulse counterpart.
Pacs: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Dv, 03.65.Bz, 89.80.+h
Quantum information theory suggests the possibility
of accomplishing tasks which are beyond the capability
of classical computer science, such as information-secure
cryptographic key distribution [1,2]. The lack of security
proofs for standard (secret- and public-) key distribu-
tion schemes, and the insecurity of the strongest classical
schemes against “quantum attacks” [3], emphasizes the
need for information-secure key distribution. Whereas
the security of idealized quantum key distribution (qkd)
schemes has been investigated against very sophisticated
collective and joint attacks (e.g., [4,5]), the experimental
qkd schemes have been proven secure against the simple
individual attack only recently [6] (via the application of
ideas presented here).
In the four-state scheme [1], usually referred to as
Bennett-Brassard-84 (BB84), the sender (Alice) and the
receiver (Bob) use two conjugate bases (say, the recti-
linear basis, +, and the diagonal basis, ×) for the po-
larization of single photons. In basis + they use the
two orthogonal basis states |0+〉 and |1+〉 to represent
“0” and “1” respectively. In basis × they use the two
orthogonal basis states |0×〉 = (1/
√
2)[|0+〉 + |1+〉] and
|1×〉 = (1/
√
2)[|0+〉 − |1+〉] to represent “0” and “1”.
The basis is revealed later on via an unjammable and in-
secure classical channel. The signals where Bob used the
same basis as Alice form the sifted key on which Bob can
decode the bit value. The remaining signals are being
discarded. Finally, they test a few bits to estimate the
error-rate, and if the test passes (the tested error-rate
is less than some pre-agreed threshold), they use error-
correction and privacy amplification to obtain a poten-
tially secure final key [7,8].
The security of that scheme, which assumes a source
of perfect qubits as well as losses and errors which are
bounded by some small threshold, has been investigated
in various works. Very simple attacks already render re-
alistic qkd impossible, as we show here.
The experiments are usually based on weak coherent
pulses (wcp) as signal states with a low probability of
containing more than one photon [7,9]. Initial security
analysis of such weak-pulse schemes were done [7,10],
and evidence of some potentially severe security prob-
lems (which do not exist for the idealized schemes) were
shown [10,11]. We investigate such limitations much fur-
ther to show insecurity of various existing setups, and to
provide several explicit limits on experimental qkd.
First, we show that qkd can be totally impossible
for given losses and detector dark-counts, even with the
assumption of a perfect source. Second we show that
qkd can be totally insecure even with the assumption of
perfect detection, if considering losses and multi-photon
states. In a combination we conclude that, for any given
source and detection units, secure qkd schemes cannot
be implemented to arbitrarily large distance. We analyse
“weak pulse” schemes and show that the implemented
schemes are insecure. Finally we prove the advantage of
a better source such as parametric downconversion, and
we show that it presents characteristics very similar to
the semi-idealized schemes where perfect qubits are as-
sumed.
The effect of losses is that the signals will arrive only
with a probability F at Bob’s site where they will lead
to a detection in Bob’s detectors with a probability ηB
(detection efficiency). This leads to an expected prob-
ability of detected signals given by psignalexp = FηB. The
transmission efficiency F is connected to the absorption
coefficient β of the fibre, the length l of the fibre and a
distance-independent constant loss in optical components
c, via the relation
1
F = 10−
β l+c
10 (1)
which, for given β and c, gives a one-to-one relation be-
tween distance and transmission efficiency. Bob’s de-
tector is also characterized by a dark count probability
pdarkexp = dB. The dark counts are due to thermal fluctua-
tions in the detector, stray counts, etc. In practice, dB is
inferred as counts per time slot in the absence of the real
signal. The total expected probability of detection events
is therefore given by pexp = p
signal
exp + p
dark
exp − psignalexp pdarkexp
and neglecting the coincidence term (all involved proba-
bilities are small) we get
pexp ≈ psignalexp + pdarkexp . (2)
The two contributions to the detected signals con-
tribute differently to the error rate. The signal con-
tributes an error with a probability psignale , per (arriving)
signal, due to misalignment or polarization diffusion. The
corresponding error probability per time slot is given by
esignal = psignalexp p
signal
e . On the other hand, a dark count
contributes an error with probability pdarke = 1/2, hence
the corresponding contribution to the error rate per time
slot is given by edark = pdarkexp (1/2). The total error rate
per time slot, e, is e ≈ psignalexp psignale + 12pdarkexp , ignoring
the coincidence term. The contribution to the error rate
per sifted key bit is then given by pe = e/pexp. Let us
consider the dark counts (in the absence of any signal)
to be a fixed parameter of an experimental setup. Thus,
the dark count contribution to the error-rate becomes
dominant when psignalexp is decreased, that is, when the
distance is increased. In the following, we use the bound
e >≈ 1
2
pdarkexp , to obtain limits on the distance of secure
qkd.
If the error rate per sifted key bit pe exceeds 1/4 and
we (conservatively) assume that the eavesdropper has full
control on the errors, there is no way to create a secure
key. With such an allowed error-rate, a simple inter-
cept/resend attack causes Bob and Eve to share (approx-
imately) half of Alice’s bits and to know nothing about
the other half; hence, Bob does not possess information
which is unavailable to Eve, and no secret key can be
distilled. Using pe = e/pexp and pe <
1
4
, we obtain the
necessary condition for secure qkd
pexp >
e
1/4
, (3)
and using Eq. 2 and e ≥ pdarkexp /2, we finally obtain
psignalexp + p
dark
exp ≥ 2pdarkexp .
For ideal single-photon states we therefore obtain (with
psignalexp = FηB and p
dark
exp = dB) the bound FηB+dB > 2dB
which finally gives FηB > dB. We see that even for ideal
single-photon sources (SP), the existence of a dark count
rate leads to a minimum transmission rate
F > FSP =
dB
ηB
(4)
below which qkd cannot be securely implemented. [Even
for perfect detection efficiency (ηB = 1) we get a bound
F > FSP = dB.] These bounds correspond, according to
Eq. 1, to a maximal covered distance.
In a quantum optical implementation single-photon
states would be ideally suited for quantum key distribu-
tion. However, such states have not yet been practically
implemented for qkd, although proposals exist and ex-
periments have been performed to generate such states.
The signals produced in the experiments usually contain
zero, one, or more than one photon in the same polar-
ization (with probabilities p0 p1, and pmulti respectively.)
The multi-photon part of the signals leads to a severe se-
curity hole, as has been anticipated earlier [7,10,11]. Let
us present the photon number splitting (PNS) attack,
which is a modification of an attack suggested in [10]
(the attack of [10] was disputed in [11] so the modifica-
tion is necessary): Eve deterministically splits one pho-
ton off each multi-photon signal. To do so, she projects
the state onto subspaces characterised by n, which is the
total photon number, which can be measurement via a
quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement. The pro-
jection into these subspaces does not modify the polar-
ization of the photons. Then she performs a polarization-
preserving splitting operation, for example, by an interac-
tion described by a Jaynes-Cummings Hamiltonian [12]
or an active arrangement of beamsplitters combined with
further QND measurements. She keeps one photon and
sends the other (n−1) photons to Bob. We assume (con-
servatively) that Bob’s detector cannot resolve the pho-
ton number of arriving signals. When receiving the data
regarding the basis, Eve measures her photon and obtains
full information. Each signal containing more than one
photon in this way will yield its complete information to
an eavesdropper.
The situation becomes worse in the presence of loss, in
which case the eavesdropper can replace the lossy chan-
nel by a perfect quantum channel and forward to Bob
only a chosen signal. This suppression is controlled such
that Bob will find precisely the number of signals as ex-
pected given the characterisation of the lossy channel. If
there is a strong contribution by multi-photon signals,
then Eve can use only those signals and suppress the
single-photon signals completely, to obtain full informa-
tion on the transmitted bits. Even for the case of perfect
detectors in Bob’s hands (ηB = 1 and dB = 0) the above
argument leads to a neccesary condition for security
psignalexp > pmulti. (5)
If this condition is violated, Eve gets full information
without inducing any errors. For given probabilities p1
and pmulti (and given transmission rate F ), a bound on
the distance is obtained, even for perfect detection.
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We assume that Eve has control on ηB (which is a rea-
sonable assumption, but somewhat conservative); also we
use the standard conservative assumption that all errors
are controlled by Eve (including dark counts). Without
these assumptions, one gets much better security but one
that is more difficult to justify properly.
Whereas this work concentrates mainly on insecurity
results, we also obtained here a result important for pos-
itive security proofs: For a general source (emitting into
the four BB84 polarization modes) analyzing all possible
attacks in a large Hilbert space (the Fock space) is a very
difficult task. However, if Alice can dephase the states to
create a mixture of “number states” (in the chosen BB84
polarization state) the transmitted signals are replaced
by mixed states. Then, these states do not change at all
when Eve performs the QND part of the PNS attack! [A
QND measurement on the total photon number]. There-
fore Eve can start her attack by a PNS attack without
loss of generality, and hence, the PNS attack becomes
the optimal attack. Fortunately, in realistic scenarios
the dephasing happens automatically (or with little help
of Alice) Following this observation, a complete positive
security proof against all individual particle attacks has
been subsequently given [6]. More sophisticated collec-
tive and joint attacks can also be restricted to the PNS
attacks.
Let us return to the necessary condition for security.
We can combine the idea of the two criteria above, (3,
5), to a single, stronger one, given by
e
1/4
< pexp − pmulti . (6)
This criterion stems from the scenario that Eve splits
all multi-photon signals while she eavesdrops on some of
the single-photon signals. We can think of the key as of
consisting of two parts: an error free part steming from
multi-photon signals, and a part with errors coming from
single-photon signals. The error rate in the second key
has therfore to obey the same inequality as used in cri-
terion (3).
We now explore the consequences of the necessary con-
dition for security for two practical signal sources. These
are the weak coherent pulses and the signals generated
by parametric downconversion.
In qkd experiments the signal states are, typically,
weak coherent pulses containing, on average, much less
than one photon. The information is contained in polar-
ization mode of the wcp.
Coherent states |α〉 = e−|α|2/2∑n αn/√n!|n〉 with am-
plitude α (chosen to be real) give a photon number dis-
tribution (per pulse [16]) pn = e
−α2
(
α2
)n
/n!. Since we
analyze PNS attack only, it doesn’t matter if the realis-
tic “coherent state” is a mixture of number states. Thus,
psignalexp =
∑∞
n=1 exp(−FηBα2)
(
FηBα
2
)n
/n! and pmulti =∑∞
n=2 exp(−α2)
(
α2
)n
/n!. With pexp ≈ psignalexp + dB and
the error rate e = 1
2
dB we find for α
2 ≪ 1 (by expanding
to 4th oder in α and neglecting the term proportional to
F 2η2Bα
4) the result
F >
dB
ηB α2
+
α2
ηB 2
. (7)
Obviously, there is an optimal choice for α2 which leads
to the bound
F > FWCP =
√
2dB/ηB. (8)
To illustrate this example we insert numbers taken from
the experiment performed at 1.3µm by Marand and
Townsend [13]. We use ηB = 0.11, dB = 10
−5. Then
the criterion gives F > 0.041. With a constant loss of
5 dB and a fiber loss at 0.38 dB/km, this is equivalent,
according to Eq. (1), to a maximum distance of 24 km
at an average (much lower than standard) photon num-
ber of 4.5 × 10−3. As we used approximations in the
evaluation of Eq. (6), the achievable distance could differ
slightly from this values either way.
With α2 = 0.1, as in the literature, secure transmission
to any distance is impossible, according to our conditions.
In that case, even if we assume ηB to be out of control
of the eavesdropper, we find that secure transmission to
distance of 21 km is impossible. Frequently we find even
higher average photon numbers in the literature.
The wcp scheme seems to be prone to difficulties due
to the high probability of signals carrying no photons (the
vacuum contribution). This can be overcome in part by
the use of parametric downconversion (pdc) scheme, or
other single photon sources. pdc has been used before
for qkd [14]. We use a different formulation which en-
able us to analyse the advantages and limits of the pdc
method relative to the wcp one.
To approximate a single-photon state we use a pdc
process where we create the state in an output mode de-
scribed by photon creation operator a† conditioned on
the detection of a photon in another mode described
by b†. If we neglect dispersion, then the output of
the pdc process is described [15] on the two modes
with creation operators a† and b† using the operator
Ta b(χ) = exp
{
iχ(a†b† − ab)}, with χ ≪ 1, as |Ψa b〉 =
Ta b(χ)|0, 0〉 ≈ (1−χ2/2+ 524χ4)|0, 0〉+(χ− 56χ3)|1, 1〉+
(χ2 − 7
6
χ4)|2, 2〉 + χ3|3, 3〉 + χ4|4, 4〉. The states in this
description are states of photon flux, and we assume the
addition of choppers in order to deal with photon num-
bers per pulse as in the wcp case.
If we had an ideal detector resolving photon num-
bers (that is, a perfect counter) then we could cre-
ate a perfect single-photon state by using the state in
mode a conditioned on the detection of precisely one
photon in the pulse in mode b. However, realistic de-
tectors useful for this task have a single-photon detec-
tion efficiency far from unity and can resolve the pho-
ton number only at high cost, if at all. Therefore, we
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assume a detection model which is described by a fi-
nite detection efficiency ηA and gives only two possible
outcomes: either it is not triggered or it is triggered,
thereby showing that at least one photon was present.
The detector may experiences a dark count rate at dA
per time slot. The two POVM elements describing this
kind of detector can be approximated for our purpose
by E0 = (1 − dA)|0〉〈0| +
∑∞
n=1(1 − ηA)n|n〉〈n| and
Eclick = dA|0〉〈0| +
∑∞
n=1(1 − (1 − ηA)n)|n〉〈n|. The re-
duced density matrix for the output signal in mode b
conditioned on a click of the detector monitoring mode a
is then given by
ρ =
1
N
Trb [|Ψa b〉〈Ψa b|Eclick] ≈ 1
N
[
dA(1− χ2 + 2
3
χ4)|0〉〈0|
+ ηAχ
2(1− 5
3
χ2)|1〉〈1|+ ηA(2− ηA)χ4|2〉〈2|
]
(9)
with the normalization constant N . To create the four
signal states we rotate the polarization of the signal, for
example using a beam-splitter and a phase shifter. Note
that a mixture of Fock states is created by the detection
process, so that the PNS attack is optimal for Eve.
After some calculation following the corresponding cal-
culation in the wcp case, the necessary condition for se-
curity (6) takes for the signal state (9) the form
F >
dA dB
ηA ηB χ2
+
dB
ηB
+
2− ηA
ηB
χ2 (10)
since we assume dB ≪ 1 and χ2 ≪ 1 and neglect terms
going as χ4, dBdA, and χ
2dB. The first error term is due
to coincidence of dark counts, the second error term is
due to coincidence of a photon loss and a dark count at
Bob’s site; the third term is the effect of multi photon
signal (signals that leak full information to the eaves-
dropper). As we did in the wcp case, we optimize this
expression to find the criterion
F > FPDC = 2
√
dA dB (2− ηA)
ηA η2B
+
dB
ηB
. (11)
If we now assume that Alice and Bob use the same de-
tectors as in the wcp case with the numbers provided
by [13] we obtain FPDC > 8.4 × 10−4 corresponding via
Eq. (1) to a length of 68 km.
Since we can use down-conversion set-ups which give
photon pairs with different wavelength, we can use
sources so that one photon has the right wavelength for
transmission over long distances, e.g. 1.3 µm, while the
other photon has a frequency which makes it easier to
use efficient detectors [14]. In the limit of Alice using
perfect detectors (but not perfect counters) (ηA = 1 and
dA = 0), we obtain
FPDC = dB/ηB , (12)
as for the single-photon source. leading to a maximal
distance of 93 km. This optimal distance might also be
achievable using new single-photon sources of the type
suggested in [17].
We have shown a necessary condition for secure qkd
which uses currently experimental implementations. We
find that secure qkd might be achieved with the pre-
sented experiments using wcp if one would use appropri-
ate parameters for the expected photon number, which
are considerably lower than those used today. With cur-
rent parameters, it seems that all current experiments
cannot be proven secure. The distance which can be cov-
ered by qkd is mainly limited by the fiber loss, but wcp
schemes might be totally insecure even to zero distance
(in several of the existing experiments), due to imperfect
detection. The distance can be increased by the use of
parametric downconversion as a signal source, but even
in this case the fundamental limitation of the range per-
sists, and a radical reduction of β or of the dark counts
is required in order to increase the distance to thousands
of kilometers.
The use of quantum repeaters (based on quantum
error-correction or entanglement purification) in the far
future, can yield secure transmission to any distance, and
the security is not altered even if the repeaters are con-
trolled by Eve [18].
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